United States of America v. State of Florida - Final Order of Dismissal

III.

The Department's claim for relief in this case seeks to augment the manner in which the State has chosen to deliver its service system for children with disabilities. The Supreme Court has previously recognized that constitutional principles of federalism erect limits on the federal government's ability to direct state officers or to interfere with the functions of state governments. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). In areas where Congress does possess power to alter federal-state relations, the Supreme Court has required that ''if Congress intends to alter the usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government, it must make its intention to do so unmistakelably clear.'' Will v. Mich. Dept. Of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989) (internal quotations omitted); see also United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971) ("the requirement of a clear statement assures that the legislature has in fact faced, and intended to bring into issue, the critical matters involved in the judicial decision") Thus, when Congress has utilized its Spending Power to induce states to establish policies that it could not otherwise compel them to enact, the Supreme Court has required that conditions attached to federal funding be expressed clearly and unambiguously. See Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 & 24 (1981). Similarly, when Congress seeks to abrogate states' sovereign immunity, its intention to do so must be unequivocal. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985). Although these principles do not directly govern disposition of this case, they do animate the limits Congress itself has placed on statutory suits against states.

When Congress has authorized litigation by federal agencies against state and local governments, that authorization has come in clear terms and often with strict conditions. See e.g., 42 U.S.C. §1997a (CRlPA) (authorizing suit by the Attorney General against state-run institutions where conditions are egregious or flagrant, the harm grievous, and a pattern or practice of violations exists); 42 U.S.C. §2000h-2 (Title IX of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) (authorizing the Attorney General to intervene in any suit seeking relief from the denial of equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment if she certifies that the case is of general public importance); 42 U.S.C. §2000c-6(a) (Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) (authorizing the Attorney General to sue state-operated schools after giving notice to the school board of complaints of racial discrimination and an opportunity to adjust the conditions alleged in the complaint); 42 U.S.C. §2000b(a) (Title III of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) (authorizing the Attorney General to sue for racial discrimination in state-owned facilities). Statutes such as these fueled the Supreme Court's observation in Newport News that ''the United States Code displays throughout that when an agency in its governmental capacity is meant to have standing, Congress says so.'' 514 U.S. at 129.

Titles I and III of the ADA say that the Attorney General has standing to commence civil litigation. Title II does not. The Court's ''job is to honor the [] statutory language..." Arcia v. Fla. Sec'y of State, 772 F.3d 1335, 1347 (11th Cir. 2014) That language requires the Court to conclude that the Attorney General does not have standing to assert the claim raised in this case. To hold otherwise would be for the Court to make the naked judicial claim to legislative power--a claim fundamentally at odds with our system of government--to be able to rewrite Title II in accord with the Department's textual interpretation.